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Abstract—This paper examines how moving target defences
(MTD) implemented in power systems can be countered by
unsupervised learning-based false data injection (FDI) attack
and how MTD can be combined with physical watermarking to
enhance the system resilience. A novel intelligent attack, which
incorporates density-based spatial clustering and dimensionality
reduction, is developed and shown to be effective in maintaining
stealth in the presence of traditional MTD strategies. In resisting
this new type of attack, a novel implementation of MTD combin-
ing with physical watermarking is proposed by adding Gaussian
watermark into physical plant parameters to drive detection of
traditional and intelligent FDI attacks, while remaining hidden
to the attackers and limiting the impact on system operation and
stability.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, false data injection attacks,
power systems state estimation, moving target defence, and
physical watermarking.
I. Introduction
THE modern power system is increasingly dependent oncommunication integrated devices for efficiency, reliabil-
ity and control. The higher levels of inter-connectivity in the
infrastructure and a ubiquitous use of communications have
resulted in new types of vulnerabilities which have not been
fully covered by the existing defence frameworks. Occurrences
such as the 2015 cyber-attack against distribution companies
in Ukraine [1] have drawn attention to the field of defence
against cyber-threats. The Ukraine attack took many months
of infiltration and was successful in compromising the SCADA
system and de-energizing a portion of the grid for a few hours.
However, the attack itself was discovered almost instantly once
implemented. If the attackers had opted for a stealthy attack
type, such as FDI attacks, the attackers may have been able to
continue attacking for months or years without being detected
and the eventual consequences could have been much greater.
FDI attacks, first outlined in [2], involve altering system
measurements to corrupt a network operator’s state estimation
process and cause negative consequences such as line over-
loading or outage masking [3]. A comprehensive review of
FDI attacks can be found in [4]. FDI attacks need to remain
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undetected by the network operator to be effective. To this end,
FDI attacks compete with bad data detectors (BDD) within
state estimation processes. In modern energy management
systems (EMS), the BDD at the power system level relies on
weighted-least squares (WLS) and chi-squared error testing
[5], meaning an attacker needs to structure the attack based
on the system model in order to remain undetected. Initial
models for FDI attacks assumed full knowledge of the system
and full access to meter measurements within the system
[2]. An incomplete knowledge attack was introduced in [6],
which showed a system could be attacked with only partial
knowledge of the system topology and a subset of meter
measurements. In [7] the blind FDI attack is introduced,
which requires no system knowledge provided the attacker
has access to all meters within the attacked grid system. The
blind FDI attack uses independent component analyses (ICA)
to map the inter-correlations of the visible meter measurements
to create an approximation for the power flow model. A
more effective version of the attack which utilizes partial
susceptance knowledge was developed in [8], allowing an
islanded approach where the visible or ’high knowledge’ parts
of the system could be attacked by the standard-FDI attack
while low information areas by the blind approach. Some
recent studies enhanced FDI attacks by combining with other
forms of attacks, such as denial of service (DoS) attack [9].
In addition, data-driven approaches have recently been
applied to FDI attacks, although mostly from the defenders
perspective [10][11]. For FDI attack, A data-driven form is
suggested in [12], wherein the singular value decomposition is
used to construct attack vectors without knowing the system
measurement matrix. In [13], two strategies using subspace
separation are suggested: one aims to use estimated system
subspace to hide attack vectors and another aims to mislead
BDD so that non-attacked measurements are removed. These
methods allow for admittance values to be estimated but
require a large number of historical measurements. In [14],
sparse FDI attacks against wide area measurement systems and
defense methods are explored. Using historical data to mount
FDI by using multiple linear regression model was outlined in
[15]. However, the above literature all focus on fixed network
topology, while whether and how data-driven approaches can
be applied to design FDI attacks under intentional or uninten-
tional topology changes has not yet been investigated.
In fact, as FDI attacks are dependent on the characteristics of
the physical system, a body of work has emerged to utilize the
physical system to actively defend against the attacks. In par-
ticular, MTD is proposed through either transmission switch-
ing [16] or admittance perturbation via distributed flexible AC
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transmissions (D-FACTs) devices [17][18] to change physical
system topology to proactively drive BDD. An analysis of
MTD against FDI attacks is offered in [19] where they prove
the susceptibility of isolated state measurements and design an
algorithm for branch perturbation selection. Some limitations
of MTD were explored in [20]. With the increasing capability
of the attackers, there are growing interests in the research
community to design new forms of MTD which can hide its
existence to the attacker. One of the key state-of-the-art papers
in this field is [21], which presents an enhanced hidden MTD
model to make the topology change invisible to an attacker via
identifying alternative topology and state combinations under
the same power flow profile. Whilst this method is clearly
effective, it relies on being able to find alternative topology
and states to maintain constant power flows, which can be
computationally expensive and even infeasible in a system
with limited acceptable state ranges.
In this context, this paper examines the vulnerability of
current MTD under unsupervised learning-based FDI attacks
and develop a new form of stealth MTD to increase system
resilience. Our main contributions are twofold:
• On the attacking front, this work introduces a novel
new counter-MTD technique. Where previous FDI attacks
have been designed against static systems, we seek to
offer new attacking considerations in the presence of
dynamic systems with MTD. The proposed intelligent
attack under zero system knowledge assumption com-
bines unsupervised learning and dimensionality reduction
to identify underlying clusters associated with network
topology and design the corresponding attack vector. The
method is shown to be effective and stealthy against
traditional MTD.
• From the defensive perspective, we introduce a new im-
plementation of MTD to drive detection of traditional and
intelligent FDI attacks in power systems. The proposed
defence strategy combines MTD and physical watermark-
ing concept [22], for the first time, to add a Gaussian
watermark into physical plant parameters. As the added
watermark mimics the underlying noise of the system,
the physical changes driven by MTD stay hidden. The
physical watermarking is combined with cumulative error
monitoring to spot minor but sustained changes in the
system to trigger alarm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem
formulation and underlying basis for FDI attacks and MTD
through topology and parameter changes is outlined in section
2. Section 3 details the design of the proposed intelligent
attack, justification for algorithm selection and demonstration
of its effectiveness in circumventing MTD. Section 4 proposes
the Gaussian style physical watermark in physical system
parameters with cumulative error detection approach. Section
5 contains the results and analysis of the different types of
MTD as applied to blind FDI attacks and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
II. Problem Formulation
A. State Estimation
A static power system problem is considered, consisting of
a set of n state variables x ∈ Rn×1 estimated by analysing a set
of m meter measurements z ∈ Rm×1 and corresponding error
vector e ∈ Rm×1 . The non-linear vector function h(.) relating
meter measurements z to states h(x) = (h1(x), h2(x), ..., hm(x))T
is shown by
z = h(x) + e. (1)
With real power flow measurements under the non-linear
expression defined by
Pi j = V2i gi j − ViV jgi j cos ∆θi j − ViV jbi j sin ∆θi j. (2)
For simplicity and clarity, we first derive the initial formu-
lation and condition based on the linear DC approximation of
AC state estimation. A mathematical extension and simulations
on original system are then preformed in later sections to
demonstrate the applicability of the proposed methods in full
AC state estimation.
As a result, the matrix formulation, represented by a linear
regression model as a function of the Jacobian H ∈ Rm×n
matrix and the state vector, can be expressed as:
z = Hx + e. (3)
The state estimation problem is to find the best fit estimate
of xˆ corresponding to the measured power flow values of
z. Under the most widely used estimation approach, the
state variables are determined by minimization of a WLS
optimization problem as
min J(x) = (z −Hx)TW(z −Hx). (4)
W is a diagonal m ×m matrix consisting of the measurement
weights.
A solution for a minimal J(x) can be analytically obtained
by taking the 1st derivative with respect to x and solving for
0, yielding xˆ defined by
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz. (5)
B. Bad Data Detection
The current approach in power systems operation for bad
data detection is to use the 2-norm of the measurement residual
with a detection threshold η [23]. The residual r is defined by
the difference between the measured power flow values of z
and the value calculated from the estimated state values xˆ and
the known topology matrix H
r = ||z −Hxˆ||2. (6)
Assuming the errors of state variable x are random, inde-
pendent and follow a normal distribution with mean zero and
unit N(0, σ2), a chi-squared distribution model χ2m−n,α with
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, SUBMITTED ON 14 APRIL 2020 3
m− n degrees of freedom and confidence interval α (typically
0.95 or 0.99) can be used to define the detection threshold as
η = σ
√
χ2m−n,α. (7)
If rt > η BDD alarms will trigger and the system operator
will discard the result, removing the elements from the residual
calculation with large values and replacing with an appropriate
pseudo-measurement, based on historical data.
C. Constructing Attack Vectors
In the case of an infinitely resourced and knowledgeable
attack, the attacker can gain full access to the metering
infrastructure and change measured power flows in any desired
manner. In this case, it is trivial to design the attack to maintain
a residual at a given value. The attacker can choose any linear
combination of Hc where c ∈ Rn×1. The vector c can be
selected to have the desired impact on the state vector x:
za = z + a = z + Hc. (8)
The 2-norm residual remains unchanged as shown below:
ra = ‖(z + a) −H(xˆ + c)‖2= ‖z −Hxˆ‖2. (9)
In a more realistic scenario, where the attacker has full
access to the metering infrastructure but no understand-
ing of how the network components interconnect or the
branch admittance, the attacker has to commit a ”blind”
form of attack by estimating plausible attack vector mod-
els based on historical measurements. One way of achiev-
ing this is to utilize Blind Source Separation (BSS) tech-
niques. This scenario has been outlined previously in [7].
The relationship between the state variables in a power system
and latent independent variables y under a fixed topology H
can be described by
x = f(H, y). (10)
In practice y represents the loads of power system which
vary independently while the topology is fixed but other
underlying latent variables may exist for some systems. The
state vector x can be approximated as the first-order coefficient
of the taylor expansion A around y.
x ≈ Ay. (11)
Returning to the state estimation problem, the system states
can then be expressed in terms of load such that
z ≈ HAy + e. (12)
If the attacker can acquire HA, an attack vector can be
constructed with a value selected for a change in power flows
δy shown by
zb = z + HAδy. (13)
A generalized form of blind source separation u = Gv can
be used, where u is the vector that can be directly observed,
G is the fixed vector known as the mixing matrix and v
the underlying vector of signals. The state estimation can be
constructed in an equivalent manner such that:
z = HAy = Gy. (14)
Provided the errors follow a Gaussian distribution and do not
contain gross errors, HA can be extracted using independent
component analysis as shown previously in [7] [24].
D. AC Extension of Blind Attack
Similar to the DC attack, AC FDI attacks must satisfy the
system model to remain hidden such that
za = z + a = h(x + c). (15)
This can be done without topology information either using
the geometric approach [25] or a historical measurement based
replay approach. Chin et al showed that where the vector
angle between the normal power flows and attacking vector
was defined by
zTa = cos(ψ) (16)
the attack can bypass AC detection provided the vector space
angle between the attacking vector and measurement vector
was close to zero such that
zTza = 1. (17)
Under these considerations, a regression model can be
extracted to attack the system. Alternatively, in the case
of limited information, the attacker can implement a replay
style attack which reuses a previous vector from historical
measurements such that
zat = zt−q (18)
where q is used to denote a vector from a previous time
period. Our AC simulations were built with this replay case
in mind, but it should be noted both methods are susceptible
to conventional MTD.
E. MTD through Topology Changes
Under AC state estimation, system measurements will con-
sist of real power flows defined by Equation 2 and reactive
power by
(19)Qi j = −V2i (bi j + bshi j ) + ViV jgi j cos ∆θi j
− ViV jbi j sin ∆θi j.
For real power residual, error at the individual measurement
level will be the difference between the measured flows and
estimated value from the system model such that real power
residual can be expressed as
(20)r
P
i j = −Pmi j + V2i gi j − ViV jgi j cos ∆θi j
− ViV jbi j sin ∆θi j.
and reactive power flow residual can be expressed as
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(21)r
Q
i j = −Qmi j − V2i (bi j + bshi j ) + ViV jgi j cos ∆θi j
− ViV jbi j sin ∆θi j.
In the AC state estimation, MTD can employ resistive as
well as inductive components to introduce change. Alterna-
tively, the SO can aim to force a state of non-convergence
in the case of FDI which is done by violating the non-
convergence criteria of the Newton-Raphson principle for
power systems. Again, the alarm criteria will be the 2-norm
value of the residual vector calculated by
rac = ‖z − h(xˆ)‖2. (22)
We derive here the analytical expression of the impact
on residual of topology change for a linear system under
attack vector a = Hc. Using the WLS formulation, ra can
be expressed as
ra = ‖(z + Hc) −H(HTWH)−1HTW(z + Hc)‖2. (23)
The attacker is assumed to have static topology knowledge
and construct the injected attack vector za as a function of the
original topology Ho. The new topology with MTD applied
is Hn, which is only known by the SO. As a result, the
measurement vector under attack za will be
za = z + Hoc. (24)
The SO estimates xˆ via the WLS minimization using the
visible za and Hn. The min error estimate of xˆn will utilize the
new topology Hn while the attack vector is developed based
on the old topology Ho. Consequently, the new residual will
be a product of the attack vector based on old topology Hoc
and the WLS estimation based on the new topology as
rn = ‖z + Hoc −Hn(HTnWHn)−1HTnW(z + Hoc)‖2. (25)
Defining WLS minimization factor for the new topol-
ogy as Fn, which is fixed for a given topology as Fn =
(HTnWHn)−1HTnW, the residual 2-norm can be rewritten as
rn = ‖z + Hoc −HnFn(z + Hoc)‖2. (26)
Considering the old topology Ho as a function of the new
and system change Hn + ∆H, the residual in terms of the new
topology can hence be calculated as
rn = ‖z + (Hn + ∆H)c −HnFn(z + (Hn + ∆H)c)‖2. (27)
HnFnHn is the idempotent matrix of H and therefore
HnFnHnc = Hnc the expression can be rearranged into
rn = ‖(1 −HnFn)z + (1 −HnFn)∆Hc‖2. (28)
As shown in Equation 28, any ∆H will change the residual
value rn. The aim of defender is to select a value for ∆H such
that under attack vector Hoc, the new residual exceeds the
alarm criteria (usually chi-squared criteria) rn > σ
√
χ2m−n,α.
Figure 1. Proposed algorithm process to circumvent MTD. Red and blue
points corresponded to observed power flows from 2 different network
configurations.
III. Clustering to Circumvent MTD
This section investigates how data-driven approach can
be applied to explore the vulnerability of existing MTD.
In particular, an efficient method is proposed to identify
changes in the network caused by the implementation of D-
FACTS or switching through analysing the resultant power
flow profiles. By doing so, the attacker can ensure only data
points corresponding to the current configuration are used to
create the blind attack. The proposed attack flow follows:
1) Observations of historical power flows are clustered into
groups.
2) The clustering algorithm identifies the current power
flow set to find corresponding measurements for the
attack model.
3) The blind attack model is developed using only the data
corresponding to the current power flow profile cluster.
This process is illustrated and compared with the normal
blind attack in Figure 1. To achieve this, we propose a combi-
nation of density based spatial clustering of application with
noise (DBSCAN) for the clustering and data prepossessing
via T-distributed stochastic neighbour embedding (T-SNE) for
dimensionality reduction.
A. Algorithm Design Considerations
1) Curse of Dimensionality: Due to the blind nature of
the attack, no prior classification is possible and therefore
an unsupervised learning method is required. Unsupervised
learning methods often suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
For example, hierarchical clustering has a time complexity of
O(n3) making it highly computationally intensive for large
systems. To address this, we have opted to implement a
layer of dimensionality reduction using T-SNE before applying
the clustering algorithm. Native T-SNE itself has a time
complexity of O(n2) but can be reduced to O(n) by using
optimization techniques as discussed in [26]. The brunt of
the computational load is therefore taken by T-SNE which
reduces the measurements of the network power flows into
2-dimensional space. Native K-means has a similar time
complexity to native T-SNE but was unsuitable due to the
requirement to pre-define the numbers of clusters.
2) Choice of Unsupervised Learning Method: DBSCAN
is easy to implement and has been shown to have good
benchmark performance when compared with a number of
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different options [27]. Considerations on time complexity were
also made. DBSCAN has a time complexity of O(n2) but
this can be reduced to O(n log n) with parameter optimisation
[28]. However as the data is dimension reduced before hand,
this time complexity should not cause significant increases in
processing time.
B. T-Distributed Stochastic Neighbours
High dimensionality in data sets can make effective analysis
and visualization of data trends difficult. It can also signifi-
cantly increase computational requirements [29]. T-SNE is a
form of dimensionality reduction which works by constructing
probability distributions over pairs of objects containing high
dimensionality [30].
Consider a set of N high dimension objects. di and d j are
two points within this set. σi is the variance of the Gaussian
centred on data point di. The closeness of these data points is
defined by the conditional probability p j|i that point d j would
select di as a neighbour given that the neighbours are picked
proportionately to a Gaussian centred around d j. This is given
by
p j|i =
exp(−||di − d j||2/2σ2i )∑
k,i exp(−||di − d j||2/2σ2i )
. (29)
The aim of T-SNE is to reduce these points into their low
dimensional counterparts g j and gi. These have an equivalent
conditional probability q j|i defined by
q j|i =
exp (−||gi − g j||2)∑
k,i exp((−||gi − g j||2)) . (30)
If the map points g j and gi correctly model the similarity
between the high dimensional sets, the conditional probabili-
ties p j|i and q j|i will be equal. The positions of gi and g j are
determined via gradient descent between the distributions p
and q, and is used to minimize the Kullback-Leiber divergence
via cost function C [31] shown by
C =
∑
i
KL(Pi||Qi) =
∑
i
∑
j
p j|i log
p j|i
q j|i
, (31)
where Pi is the conditional probability distribution over all data
points given data point di and Qi is the conditional probability
distribution over every other map point, given map point gi.
C. Intelligent Blind FDI Attack
This sub-section details the proposed intelligent blind FDI,
as outlined in Algorithm 1. Once the attacker obtained ade-
quate amount of measurement data, the attacker can initiate the
attack algorithm. When the latest measurement data arrive, T-
SNE is firstly applied for dimensionality reduction of the sets
of power flow observations into a two dimensional space. The
reduced form of the data set is then clustered via the DBSCAN
algorithm into distinct subgroups of like measurements and the
one corresponding to the current system topology is identified.
The mixing matrix is subsequently derived based on this
subgroup of data by using independent component analysis
as per the normal blind attack. A vector of false data za
Figure 2. Observations of 1% MTD applied to 14 lines intermittently.
containing the desired attack bias will be then calcualted based
on the mixing matrix .
Algorithm 1 DBSCAN Blind-ICA attack
Input: A set of power flow observations zobvs
Y = tsne (z˙obvs) %Dimensionality reduction
idx = dbscan(Y,mpts,) % Cluster power flows
For i = 1:length(unique(idx)) % Assign pf to cell
j = [j,idx] % Assign cluster to obvs
A{i} = j(j(:,l)==i,:)% Assign obvs to cell
c = j(end) %check what profile current z is
z = A(c) % Select only corresponding z measurements
HA = FastICA(z) % Run fastica for HA
za = z + HAδy % Apply attack vector
Output: false data za
D. Performance Analysis
A case study is carried out on a system with 14 lines
equipped with D-FACTS for MTD. As shown in Figure
2, the proposed algorithm successfully identify and cluster
the potential topology sets, although only minor changes on
topology (1% of base admittance) are applied. The compu-
tational performance of T-SNE and DBSCAN for different
IEEE test cases systems is shown in Figure 3 and compared
with hierarchical clustering with embedded cluster evaluation.
The case studies are performed for 1000 sets of observations.
We note that for small scale systems (such as the 5-bus case)
the computational performance are similar but as the system
becomes larger, the time to completion grows quickly for
hierarchical clustering.
However, this clustering based intelligent attack relies on
being able to distinguish between different topology sets from
power flow measurements. If the changes in MTD are minor
compared to the variation in power flow profile, it may become
difficult to distinguish clusters, which will be explored in the
next session to defence against such attack.
IV. Physical Gaussian Watermarking with CUSUM
While physical watermarking has not been applied in the
power system space, the concept has been proposed in control
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Figure 3. CPU processing time for the combined T-SNE/DBSCAN algorithm
with an equivalent hierarchical method with embedded cluster selection
performed on systems of increasing size. Performed for 1000 observations.
systems such as in [22] where a watermark is added into a
LQG-based control signals to drive detection. However, the
papers in these areas aren’t true ’physical’ watermarks as
they only change signal parameter dependencies and not the
underlying physical plant itself. At the same time, it should be
noted that while MTD in the form of D-Facts control to change
system topology has been explored, the use of watermarks in
combination with MTD has not been investigated and there is
an opportunity to incorporate a true physical watermark into
the system plant to enhance the system security.
Previously, topology perturbation and transmission switch-
ing have been proposed as methods to drive detection of FDI
attacks [17][21], These methods implement significant changes
to line admittance as required by the change needed in residual
(typically around 10-20% for D-Facts based changes), which
may not only lead to interruption on system operation, but
also provide opportunities for the data-driven attack to spot
the existence of MTD and counter it. As the existence of
clustering based intelligent attack proposed in Section III, it
is crucial that the deployment of MTD can remain hidden to
the attacker.
In this context, this section proposes a novel method to
achieve this by combining MTD with physical watermark-
ing, which makes the MTD itself indistinguishable from the
noise profile of the system, and monitoring sequential errors
for long-run trends by using cumulative summed monitoring
(CUSUM). CUSUM is a sequential analysis technique which
monitors for change detection over a number of measurements.
Samples taken from the process are assigned a weighting and
summed to monitor change detection. In this case, we will
monitor the measured residual r under MTD defined by
CEMt =
t∑
j=1
r j − T. (32)
where CEM is the decision statistic, T is the target value
of residual dictated by monitoring the statistic under normal
conditions and t is the number of periods in a measurement
set, with upper and lower control limits CEM+t and CEM
−
t .
As r is an absolute value, the lower bound CEM−t will be 0.
Figure 4. Observations of Gaussian watermark of 1% applied and the
equivalent noise to system measurements.
CEM+t can be selected based on engineering judgement from
prior observations. Usually the upper bound can be defined in
terms of the residual variance and mean value under no attack:
CEM+t = r¯ + Bσr. (33)
where B is defined by the user based on previous observations
and minimising type 2 error.
The proposed defence strategy introduces these minor errors
by using D-FACTS devices to alter the line admittance by a
vector w. The size of admittance changes applied to each line
is based on the output from a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG), the seed value of which is only known by the network
operator. This can be achieved with existing technology via a
Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) in combination with
a processing unit. The watermark may be applied selectively
such that
wm ∈ {0,N(0, p)}. (34)
where p is the max change applied to the branch admittance.
The resulting power flow profile under physical watermark-
ing will be equal to
zw = (H + w)x + e. (35)
where w represents the vector of admittance changes applied
to branches and is known to the SO.
The impact of applying a Gaussian style watermark in
physical system parameters is shown in Figure 4. Compared
with direct binary perturbation, the proposed MTD show
similar profile as underline noise and make it extremely hard
for clustering algorithm to identify the existence of MTD or
to counter it.
The key advantages of the proposed defence mechanism can
be summarised as below, which will be validated in the next
session:
1) As the proposed MTD is on magnitude with the noise
levels, the change in power flow observations resulting
from the MTD becomes difficult to be identified. There-
fore, MTD stays stealthy to the attacker.
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Figure 5. Probability of detection of blind FDI attack and the new attack
under transmission switching for IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems under
99% confidence interval. Lines are not perturbed simultaneously.
2) Due to the stealthiness of the proposed MTD, it sig-
nificantly increases the chance of the detection of FDI
attack and is specifically resilient to intelligent attack
types such as the proposed DBSCAN blind-ICA attack.
3) The significantly-reduced magnitude of topology
changes lead to less interruptions on the system
stability and economic operation.
V. Results and Analysis
This section assesses the performance of the proposed
intelligent blind FDI in the presence of different forms of
MTD on the standard IEEE 14-Bus and IEEE 118-bus test
systems [32]. All simulations were implemented using the
MATPOWER toolbox in MATLAB [33] and performed using
Intel Core i7-7820X CPU with 64GB of ram running on a
Windows 10 system.
A. Model Assumptions
The priority of this section is to capture the change in
detection between the blind FDI technique and the proposed
intelligent attack under different types of MTD. Some assump-
tions have been made across all simulations:
• Uncoloured Gaussian noise error of 1% noise-to-signal
was added to meter values as error e as seen previously
in [34].
• A steady load assumption is made with load variation
of around 0.1% for initial simulations in line with other
state-of-the-art works in this field such as [21]. Additional
case studies were performed with multiple load profiles.
• A minimum number of observations of 250 is assumed
initially which rises to 1000 sequentially over the course
of the simulation.
B. Transmission Switching
Figure 5 shows the impact of transmission line switching on
the blind FDI attack and DBSCAN attack for the 14 bus and
118 bus cases. For the standard blind FDI attack, transmission
switching is highly effective at introducing residual errors and
Figure 6. Probability of detection of blind FDI attack and the new attack
under admittance perturbation for IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems under
99% confidence interval. Lines are not perturbed simultaneously.
driving alarms. With a single line switching the detection is
100% for the standard blind FDI attack. However, these large
changes in the system flows make it easy for an attacker
to identify the MTD. Compared with the standard attack,
the DBSCAN attack out-performs the standard blind FDI
whenever MTD is used. Detection remained low (less than 1%)
with up to 15 lines being switched in/out across the network
at different times. Even with 16 possible topologies in use
the detection remained under 3%. Transmission switching is
unlikely to be used for the sole purpose of attack detection
due to the significant impact on the system operability.
C. Admittance Perturbation
Admittance perturbation is the most commonly proposed
method of MTD for power systems in the current literature.
This sub-section implements an admittance perturbation de-
fence against the typical blind FDI attack and the proposed
DBSCAN version. A known quantity of admittance is injected
at given lines in the power system. The system operator is
expecting to see the change in admittance reflected in the
resulting power flows. If the attacker is unaware and does
not reflect the new admittance in their attacking vector, the
residual will increase significantly and BDD will be triggered.
The results of admittance perturbation on detection of the
standard and DBSCAN blind FDI attack are shown in Figure 6.
System models with branch admittance perturbations of 10%
were implemented. The standard blind FDI attack performs
poorly against this form of MTD. For a single line at 10%
perturbation a detection level of over 95% is achieved. The
detection rates for the DBSCAN informed attack were con-
sistently low. This is due to the distinctive clusters of power
flows emerging under the steady loads assumption.
D. Physical Gaussian Watermarking with Cumulative Errors
A novel implementation of MTD technique is trialled here.
The admittance profile is varied using an PRNG with a profile
equivalent to the underlying noise of the system. As we have
used a 1% noise for our simulations the p value is set equal to
1% to ensure that this profile is not visible to the attacker. This
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Figure 7. DBSCAN detection results under proposed Gaussian watermark
with cumulative errors over 10 measurements. 14-bus and 118-bus systems
simulated for with 2 and 4 standard deviation alarm cut offs.
Figure 8. Average number of points required to break a 4 standard deviation
upper limit for increasing size of watermark applied to a single line.
is combined with cumulative error monitoring watching for
sustained increased errors over 10 measurements. As shown
in Figure 7, under the DBSCAN blind FDI attack, the CUSUM
Gaussian watermark shows significant improvements. As ad-
ditional lines are added these detection rates are close to
100% compared with under 10% for standard admittance
perturbation. The is due to the difficulty DBSCAN algorithm
has in identifying clusters for MTD on magnitude and identical
to noise profile of the system. However, it should also be noted
the increase in type-2 error resulting from this method with a
trade off between lower alarm thresholds for cumulative errors
and detection rates as shown in Figure 7. This cumulative
approach requires multiple measurements which potentially
could lead to the attacker having additional time to attack
before being caught. Therefore, there exists a trade off between
the speed to spot attacks and the magnitude of the added
watermark. Figure 8 illustrates this for the 118-bus and 14-
bus systems where for a lower level of added watermark, a
larger number of measurement points are needed to break the
4 standard deviation threshold, while the gains between using
a 2% and 10% watermark are marginal.
Figure 9. Detection of DBSCAN method under 10 distinct load profiles in
data set for the 14 bus test case. DBSCAN5k is a high information run with
5000 data points available to the attacker.
E. Load Variance Impact
In previous case studies, the simulations have been per-
formed under steady load assumptions [21]. This session inves-
tigates the impact of large load variation on the performance
of the DBSCAN attack. Case studies were performed on data
sets containing ten load levels.As shown in Figure 9, large load
variations reduce the effectiveness of the DBSCAN attack due
to the increasing challenge to cluster the topology changes
under high varying load. The rates of detection for both
MTDs increase significantly and rise steadily with the number
of lines perturbed. Once topology perturbation/switching is
being applied to five or more lines detection rises above 40%.
However, this impact can be mitigated by collecting more
previous measurements. As shown in Figure 9 the high data
point with 5k observations keeps the detection rate well below
40% even when 10 lines are perturbed.
F. Blind AC Replay Attack
We have implemented our clustering approach with a blind
replay style attack against an AC state estimation. Under this
attack the attacker attempts to inject a previously observed vec-
tor. The attacker is competing with MTD and wants to select
the replay vector from a pool of values only containing those
using the same topology configuration. In Figure 10 we can
see that the distinctive cluster relationship exists within the AC
model as shown previously for DC. Figure 11 demonstrates
that the proposed pre-clustering algorithm preforms well in AC
state estimation provided a large number of samples received.
The non-linearity in the AC model significantly reduce the
correction rate of clustering but increasing the number of
observations allows good performance for the AC model.
VI. Conclusions & Further Work
This paper, for the first time, investigate how unsupervised
learning and dimensionality reduction can be applied in blind
FDI attacks to exploit the venerability of current forms of
MTD. By incorporating a combination of T-SNE dimension-
ality reduction and the DBSCAN clustering algorithm, power
flow observations can be clustered into their relative topology
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Figure 10. Observations of 1% MTD applied to AC system up to 16 lines
intermittently. Data cuts of real power, reactive power and a combined vector
incorporating both are compared. 1% Gaussian noise assumed.
Figure 11. AC System probability of wrong cluster identified for in presence
of D-Facts MTD with increasing lines perturbed to 14-bus system
profiles and the mixing matrix for the blind FDI attack can be
calculated using only data under the same network topology.
This technique is shown to be effective against admittance
perturbation and transmission switching techniques. A novel
defence strategy against this new type attack is proposed
through combining MTD with physical watermarking to add
indistinguishable Gaussian style physical watermark into the
plant topology and monitoring the sequential errors for long-
run trends by using CUSUM. This technique is demonstrated
to be effective at both inhibiting the attacker’s ability to predict
topological changes from visible power flows and reducing the
overall impact on system operation by reducing the level of
topology changes.
Further work on this topic entails enhancing the blind FDI
model to model for other scenarios i.e. subset attacks, optimal
design of physical watermarking scheme and analysing the
effects of MTD on topological discovery techniques.
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